Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Read online

  The unstart was only the most spectacular of the A-12's problems. The J58 engines' main shaft had to be redesigned to compensate for the high temperatures. The engine mounting points were also changed. The frictional heating raised the cockpit temperature to 130 degrees. On one flight, the control stick became so hot Park had to change hands to keep from burning himself. Changes in the air-conditioning system reduced the cockpit temperature to a "warm but livable" level.[155]

  Another change caused by the heat was in the A-12's finish. The prototype had flown in a bare-metal finish without any markings. By late 1963, the edges of the chines, the spikes, and the cockpit area were painted in a heat-resistant black paint. This reduced the internal heating of the airframe.

  The aircraft also received a full set of national markings. Finding paint that could withstand exposure to high temperatures and fuel was, like everything about the plane, difficult.

  A continuing problem was foreign-object damage. Nuts, bolts, clamps, and other debris were sometimes left in the nacelles during construction.

  When the engines were run up, the debris would be sucked in and damage the engines.[156] In one case, an inspector's flashlight caused $250,000 damage. The engines would also suck rocks, asphalt pieces, and other debris off taxiways and runways.

  Changes in procedures were made, such as cleaning the nacelles with 50-horsepower vacuums, then rolling them and listening for anything rattling around.[157] Taxiways and other areas were swept to remove any debris. After landing, covers were put on the inlets and locked with a "great big pad-lock." They would be unlocked only after the pilot was strapped in the cockpit for the next flight.[158]

  Finally, after fifteen months of painful flight testing, the A-12 was ready to attempt Mach 3. The flight was made on July 20, 1963, by Lockheed test pilot Louis Schalk. Additional Mach 3 flights were made during the summer and fall.[159] In November, the design speed of Mach 3.2 was reached. It had taken sixty-six speed-buildup flights to go from Mach 2 to Mach 3.2.[160]

  In these buildup flights, the peak speed was held only momentarily. The next step was sustained Mach 3 flight. This was much more demanding than a brief dash, as the heat would soak into the plane's structure. Lockheed test pilot James Eastham made the first sustained Mach 3 flight on February 3, 1964. The plan envisioned a peak speed of Mach 3.16, which would be held for ten minutes. Eastham began the speed run at 78,000 feet. By the end of the run, the A-12 had climbed to 83,000 feet. Eastham cut the throttles and landed at Groom Lake, the end of what seemed to be a completely successful flight. Lockheed's senior flight test engineer, Glen Fulkerson said, "Turn it around, we'll fly it tomorrow." But it would be another eight weeks before the A-12 would fly again.

  During the postflight inspection, it was found that the plane had been "burned to a crisp." There had been an error in the air-speed system: rather than Mach 3.16, the plane had actually approached Mach 3.3. The heating had been far higher than predicted. The wiring had been damaged by 800-degree F temperatures. Nearly all the hydraulic fluid had been lost from the four flight-control systems — only one-half gallon remained out of the original seven and a half gallons. Eastham recalled years later, "About fifteen more seconds at speed and I think I would have been out walking."

  The engineers did not know where the h y d r a u l i c fluid had gone. There were no leaks in the ground tests. Finally they used heat lamps to raise the temperature to 600 degrees F. As the joints expanded, the 3,300 psi hydraulic fluid literally flowed out. The plane was surrounded by smoke from the vaporizing fluid. Once the hydraulic system cooled, the leaks closed up.

  The test pilots insisted a hydraulic fluid quantity gauge be added before another Mach 3 flight was made. Article 121 was fitted with the gauges (the only A-12 so equipped). After several maintenance flights, they were ready to try again.

  The A-12 took off at first light with Eastham at the controls for a thirty-minute flight. During the Mach 3 run, no leaks appeared and the communications checks were successful. Eastham cut the throttles and descended toward a landing. As the A-12 turned onto the downwind leg, the left hydraulic system failed. Eastham thought, "Oh boy, here we go again."

  Despite the failure, he landed successfully. A postflight inspection found that the brake manufacturer had put an aluminum plug in the hydraulic system. The high temperature and pressure had blown it out. At the next Monday morning technical meeting, Johnson asked, "How the hell did a piece of aluminum get in this plane?"[161]

  A-12 DERIVATIVES

  By the end of 1963, nine A-12s were at Groom Lake. They had also been joined by a derivative, the YF-12A interceptor. As the Oxcart program got under way, Johnson realized the basic A-12 airframe had a tremendous growth potential. The first derivative was to be an air-defense interceptor. The aircraft would use its Mach 3 speed to fly out to incoming Soviet bombers, which could then be destroyed well before they neared their targets.

  This plane was the ultimate expression of a trend in fighter development under way since the early 1950s. The traditional fighter, with an emphasis on maneuverability, had been replaced by all-missile-armed interceptors.

  They were not meant to attack other fighters, but rather large, nonmancu-vering bombers. It was widely accepted that any future war would be a nuclear "high noon" with the Soviet Union. There would be no "limited wars" such as Korea. Accordingly, fighter aircraft were oriented toward either nuclear delivery or interception. Ultimately, it was thought, manned aircraft would be replaced by guided missiles.

  On March 16 and 17, 1960, Johnson had met in Washington, D.C., with Air Force Brig. Gen. Howell M. Estes Jr. and Courtlandt Perkins, Air Force Secretary for Research and Development, to discuss the interceptor. They were impressed and told Johnson to meet with Gen. Marvin Demler at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. On October 31, 1960, Lockheed received a contract to build three of the Improved Manned Interceptors. The program was kept separate from the A-12. The planes were built in the same building that held the A-12 assembly line but were screened off to prevent anyone working on one project from knowing about the other.[162]

  The A-12's nose and forward chines were cut back and replaced by a bulky-looking radome and two infrared scanners. The aircraft carried a Hughes pulse-doppler AN/ASG-18 radar and fire-control system; this could detect and track aircraft flying at low altitude and long range. The aircraft carried AIM-47 Falcon missiles with either a high-explosive or a low-yield nuclear warhead. The missile had a range of 120 miles and was carried internally. The fuselage underside was redesigned to accommodate the three missile bays. A second seat for a radar intercept officer (RIO) was added to the Q-bay behind the pilot's cockpit. The addition of the radome reduced high-speed stability, but this was corrected with the addition of two fins under the nacelles and a large retractable fin under the rear fuselage.[163]

  In early January 1961, several months after the go-ahead was given for the interceptor, Johnson proposed two more A-12 derivatives — the B-12 strategic bomber and the R-12 reconnaissance aircraft. The B-12 design envisioned the nuclear weapons being carried in fuselage bays. The B-12 could carry four short-range attack missiles (SRAMs), six strike missiles, or twelve guided bombs. Targets would be picked up by radar in an A-12-like pointed nose. A second crewman would target the weapons. The B-12's mission would be "cleanup" after the initial ICBM strike. Targets in Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union could be hit, to include command posts, MiG 25 air bases, missile sites, submarine pens, and SAM sites. For the R-12 reconnaissance version, the weapons would be replaced by cameras, radar, and electronic intelligence (ELINT) equipment. To control the reconnaissance gear, a second crewman was added.

  The R-12's wartime mission would be poststrike reconnaissance. Internal stowage of the weapons and reconnaissance equipment would keep weight down and preserve the low radar cross section. A pod, like that on the B-58, was not considered.

  A mock-up of the "Reconnaissance Strike-71" (RS-71) was inspected by the air force on June 4, 1962. T
he concept of a strike A-12 ran into problems from two directions. Some in the air force saw it as a threat to the XB-70 program (also called the "RS-70"). More important, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and his "whiz kids" saw no need for manned bombers.

  In the coming years, the entire B-47 force, as well as early model B-52s, would be retired, and the XB-70 program reduced to an aeronautical research program.

  Accordingly, only the reconnaissance version of the RS-71 remained. (It kept the "strike" part of the name, however.) Externally, the plane resembled the A-12, with the nose slightly less pointed and the tail cone extended to hold more fuel. The A-12 was designed for clandestine overflights, with the minimal payload of a single camera. The RS-71, in contrast, carried a larger payload. The nose was removable and could carry either a high-resolution radar or a panoramic camera. Additional cameras or reconnaissance equipment could be carried in the chines. This gave it a much greater capability, not just for poststrike reconnaissance and overflights, but also for peacetime flights along the Soviet border.[164]

  On December 27–28, 1962, a contract was issued to Lockheed to build six test RS-71s. By this time, the A-12 had made its first flights and was about to begin its journey toward Mach 3. The first YF-12A, as the interceptor was now known, was also nearing completion.

  The first YF-12A (Article 1001) was moved to Groom Lake in July 1963.

  Final assembly was completed, and it made its first flight on August 7. The pilot was Eastham, who had written the manual and had made flight tests of the radar and missile systems in a modified B-58. During the flight, the YF-12A went supersonic. The second YF-12A (Article 1002) was flown on November 26, 1963, by Schalk. Because the A-12 had already proved the design's Mach 3 performance, the initial YF-12 flights were tests of the radar systems.[165]

  SURFACING THE OXCART

  Despite all that had happened — the crash of Article 123, the achievement of Mach 3, the sightings and rumors, the Aviation Week report, and the hundreds of people involved in building the A-12—the secrecy held. Because the A-12 was the only aircraft capable of Mach 3 cruise flight, its technology would be very valuable for the emerging U.S. supersonic-transport program. But the data could not be used as long as the plane remained secret.

  And 1964 was also a presidential election year.

  Lyndon B. Johnson had been briefed on the A-12 project a week after becoming president. He directed a plan be developed for an announcement in the spring of 1964.[166] The expected Republican candidate was Barry Goldwater, a right-wing senator who had long accused the Democrats of being soft on defense and communism. "Surfacing" the A-12 was an obvious tool to counter such charges. (Although started under Eisenhower, a Republican, the plane had first flown under John F. Kennedy, a Democrat.) By the end of February 1964, the time was judged right. At a February 29 meeting of the National Security Council, the members were briefed on the A-12 by McCone and McNamara. They were then asked for approval for a public announcement.[167] Later that day, President Johnson read a statement to the press.

  The United States has successfully developed an advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11, which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The performance of the A-11 far exceeds that of any other aircraft in the world today. The development of this aircraft has been made possible by major advances in aircraft technology of great significance for both military and commercial applications. Several A-11 aircraft are now being flight tested at Edwards Air Force Base in California. The existence of this program is being disclosed today to permit the orderly exploitation of this advanced technology in our military and commercial program.

  The debut generated considerable press attention. The stories claimed the United States had a dozen "A-11s" flying (true) and that they had already made overflights (false). President Johnson's use of "A-11" was deliberate.

  This was the original designation of the Oxcart, before the antiradar modifications were made. Should A-12 become public, it would appear it was a follow-on to the A-11, rather than the original airplane.[168]

  The personnel at Groom Lake knew an announcement was near but did not know the exact timing. Accordingly, they were taken by surprise. No A-12 or YF-12A had ever operated from Edwards Air Force Base, so the two YF-12s were hurriedly flown over by Schalk and Park. They taxied up and made a 180-degree turn in front of their new hangar. As they did, the hot exhaust was blown into the hangar and triggered the fire extinguisher valves. Water came flooding down.[169]

  The third YF-12A (Article 1003) made its first flight on March 13, 1964, and was soon transferred to Edwards. The planes embarked on tests of its missile system. It proved successful in launching missiles at Mach 3 and intercepting the target aircraft. But this was already a dead issue — McNamara had no more interest in air defenses than he did in manned bombers.

  His "cost-effectiveness" studies concluded that the Soviet bomber force was a minimal threat. Over the next several years, McNamara withheld funding to build ninety-three improved F-12B interceptors, even though funding had been approved by Congress. The existing F-101, F-102, and F-106 air-defense squadrons, radar sites, and SAM sites were closed over the next several years. The Soviets, on the other hand, were starting an aggressive bomber-development program. This resulted in the Tu-22 Backfire and the Tu-160 Blackjack — exactly the aircraft the F-12B was designed to intercept.

  Four months after the A-ll announcement, there was another. According to legend, Johnson asked an aide what the RS-71 was for. The aide responded, "strategic reconnaissance." Thus, when he announced the existence of a new reconnaissance aircraft, on July 24, 1964, President Johnson called it the "SR-71." As a result of switching the letters, twenty-five thousand drawings had to be changed.[170] The prototype SR-71 (Article 2001) was delivered to Palmdale, California, on October 29, 1964. It made its first flight on December 22, 1964, with Robert Gilliland at the controls. Unlike the secret flights from Groom Lake, the SR-71 's takeoff could be seen from the surrounding area.[171]

  Later that same day, another member of the A-12 family also made its first, secret, flight.

  President Johnson's announcements created an unusual security situation.

  Both the YF-12A and the SR-71 were White (i.e., the fact they existed was not a secret). In contrast, the A-12 was still Black. Its existence would remain a secret until 1981. To maintain the secret, all those involved were told of the coming A-ll announcement and warned to keep the A-12 separate.

  One aspect of this effort was the A-12's paint finish. From 1963 and into 1965, they had a half bare-metal, half black finish. "U.S. Air Force,"

  "USAF," and the serial numbers were in black. The SR-71 made its first flight in an all-black finish with white lettering. The A-12s were soon painted in an identical scheme. This improved temperature control, as the black paint radiated heat better than the bare metal. It also meant that it was nearly impossible to tell the difference between an A-12 and an SR-71 at any distance. (The two aircraft had nearly identical shapes.) On July 9, 1964, Park was involved with the second A-12 crash. He had completed a high-Mach check flight in a new aircraft, Article 133, and was on approach to the runway. At an altitude of 500 feet, the plane began a roll to the right. Park could not control it. When the plane reached a bank angle of 45 degrees and was only 200 feet above the ground, he ejected. Park separated from the seat and his parachute opened. As he swung down to the vertical, his feet touched the ground. The official history called it "one of the narrower escapes in the perilous history of test piloting." The A-12 hit the ground and exploded. The crash was traced to the right outboard roll and pitch control, which had frozen up. No word of the crash leaked out.[172]

  WAITING TO LEAVE THE NEST

  In early 1964, with a limited Mach 3 capability at hand, CIA headquarters began thinking about Cuban overflight missions. For several months, Fidel Castro had been threatening to attack the U-2s making overflights of Cuba. Secretar
y of State Dean Rusk suggested to President Johnson that a diplomatic note be sent to the Cubans, warning against any attempt to shoot down the planes. He added that, as a further deterrent, Castro should be given the word through Black channels that the United States had taken note of the statements, interpreted them as a threat, and that "we would like nothing better, and we are prepared to react immediately to such an eventuality."[173]

  In reality, there was little besides diplomatic warnings and veiled threats to protect the U-2s. Adding electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment to jam the SA-2 radars was studied, but it was determined this would not keep them safe from attack.[174] The U.S. government began looking at alternative means of making the overflights. The A-12 was finally selected.

  The initial plan for contingency A-12 overflights of Cuba was code-named "Skylark." Park's crash delayed the plan for a time, but on August 5, acting CIA Director, Gen. Marshall S. Carter, ordered that Skylark have an emergency operational readiness by November 5, 1964. To meet the deadline, the five CIA pilots would have to be qualified to Mach 2.8 speed and 80,000 feet altitude. The camera system would also have to be proven. One major problem was the lack of ECM equipment for the A-12s. Only one complete set of ECM gear would be ready by November. An intra-agency group was organized to study the risk. They decided the first few Cuban overflights could be made safely without full ECM equipment. Later overflights, however, would require full defensive setup. The ECM delivery schedule could meet this requirement.

  After completing training missions that simulated the Cuban overflights, the CIA A-12 unit was judged ready to undertake Skylark. It would take two-weeks' notice before an overflight could be made, and it would be done with fewer pilots and aircraft than had been planned. The next step was to convert this emergency capability into a sustained program. Training flights were conducted to determine range and fuel consumption of the A-12, to finish qualification of the pilots, and to prepare a number of Skylark mission profiles. By the end of 1964, five pilots and five aircraft stood ready to undertake sustained Cuban overflights. There were now eleven A-12s at Groom Lake — four test aircraft and seven for the CIA detachment.[175]