Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Read online

  As Skylark was becoming operational, the Lockheed test pilots were bringing the A-12 up to its full design capability. On January 27, 1965, one of the test aircraft made the first high-speed, long-range flight. The mission took one hour and forty minutes and reached speeds above Mach 3.1, at between 75,600 and 80,000 feet.

  With Skylark, the continued A-12 test flights, and the start of SR-71 test work at the site, Groom Lake was at a peak of activity during 1965.[176] Construction was finished, and the population reached 1,835 (equivalent to a small town). Lockheed-operated Constellation airliners made daily flights between Burbank and Groom Lake. There were also twice-daily C-47 flights to Las Vegas.[177]

  The Groom Lake facility had grown considerably since the U-2 days.

  The original U-2 facility at the edge of the lake bed was much expanded, with four new, larger hangars. Just south of this was the housing area, with neat rows of buildings. Conditions at Groom Lake were more livable — a movie theater replaced the projector on a mess hall table, and a baseball diamond was built. Nonetheless, the site was still isolated, hot, and barren.

  At the south end of the facility was the A-12-Lockheed area. It included individual hangars, each of which housed an A-12. The hangars provided protection against both the sun and blowing dust, as well as hiding the aircraft from the prying cameras of Soviet reconnaissance satellites. The main runway ran up to the edge of the lake bed. A long asphalt overrun strip extended out across the lake bed.[178]

  The year 1965 also saw recruitment and training of the second group of CIA A-12 pilots. There were only three members, all from operational backgrounds — Mel Vojvodich, Ronald J. Layton, and Jack C. Weeks.[179] As had the XP-59A pilots of two decades before, they lived a unique existence. They were flying the fastest airplane in the world, but not even their wives knew what they were doing. Like the Bell pilots, they used symbols to define their secret brotherhood. These took the form of flight suit patches. After seeing the A-12, Weeks dubbed it "Cygnus," after the constellation of the swan. Patches showing the constellation and "Cygnus" were made. Another patch showed a cartoon roadrunner (the unit's nickname) and the words "Road Runners" and "Beep Beep." An emblem showed a swan-shaped dragster and the words "1129th SAS The Road Runnin'est."[180]

  While the CIA pilots awaited orders to overfly Cuba, a new target appeared for the A-12. On March 18, 1965, CIA Director McCone warned McNamara that reconnaissance operations over Communist China were facing increased threats. Since 1962, four U-2s flown by Nationalist Chinese pilots had been shot down over the mainland. The A-12 was the clear alternative. It was decided to start construction of the facilities needed for the A-12 on Okinawa. This stopped short of deploying the A-12, however; a decision to overfly China could be made only by the president.

  Four days later, the A-12 operational plan, code-named "Black Shield," was ready. Initially, three A-12s would be deployed for a sixty-day period, twice a year. The aircraft would fly from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa; later, a permanent detachment would be established at Kadena. Funding was released, with the A-12 support facilities to be ready in the fall of 1965.[181]

  Reconnaissance operations over North Vietnam also were being threatened. On April 5, 1965, an SA-2 SAM site was photographed in North Vietnam. Soon, more sites were spotted near Hanoi. General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, wanted to attack the sites but was ordered not to by McNamara. His rationale was this: the SA-2s had been sent by the Soviets to appease the North Vietnamese; if the United States did not attack the SAM sites, it would send a "signal" to the North Vietnamese, who would then not use the SAMs. (Johnson and McNamara saw the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign as a means of "signaling" North Vietnam to negotiate.)

  Despite his belief that North Vietnam would not use the SAMs, McNamara asked the under secretary of the air force on June 3, 1965, about using the A-12 to replace the U-2 missions. He was told the A-12 could begin operations over North Vietnam as soon as the final qualification flights had been made. On July 24, 1965, the North Vietnamese, ignoring the U.S. signal, used the SA-2s to shoot down an air force F-4C. More U.S. aircraft were lost, and it was clear the days of the U-2 over North Vietnam were numbered.[182]

  With deployment of the A-12 seemingly at hand, the CIA unit began the final steps toward operational status. The first three "H cameras" were delivered in April 1965. Originally designed for the U-2, the H camera had a sixty-inch focal-length lens. It used Kodak 3414 film, which had a low ASA 8 rating and a frame size of four and a half inches square. The resolution from 80,000 feet was two inches. The other camera that could be carried in the A-12's Q-bay was the KA-102A. This had a forty-eight-inch focal length and carried a seven-hundred-foot-long roll of film that could provide 1,675 frames. Both the H camera and the KA-102A used a motion compensator to prevent the A-12's high speed from blurring the photos.[183]

  The pilots also began the final qualification flights. These were to prove aircraft and system reliability at speeds of Mach 3.05, altitudes of 76,000 feet, at a range of 2,300 nautical miles, with three aerial refuelings. These longer flights revealed new problems. The most important were with the electrical wiring. It was exposed to prolonged temperatures of more than 800 degrees F, as well as flexing of the structure, vibration, and shock. The wiring could not withstand the conditions, which caused malfunctions in the inlet controls, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit instrumentation. There were also continued problems with the fuel tank sealing.

  The problems, severe enough to threaten the Black Shield schedule, were traced to poor Lockheed maintenance. On August 3, 1965, CIA Deputy for Technology John Paragosky met with Kelly Johnson. They had a "frank discussion" on what was needed to fix the shortcomings. Johnson decided he would have to personally supervise activities at Groom Lake on a full-time basis; the following day, he began working at the site. The official history said Johnson's "firm and effective management" put Black Shield back on schedule.

  Four A-12s were selected to make the deployment. During the final qualification flights, the A-12 reached a speed of Mach 3.29 and an altitude of 90,000 feet. The maximum duration above Mach 3.2 was one hour and fourteen minutes. The total flight duration was six hours and twenty minutes.

  On November 22, 1965, Kelly Johnson wrote: "Over-all, my considered opinion is that the aircraft can be successfully deployed for the Black Shield mission with what I would consider to be at least as low a degree of risk as in the early U-2 deployment days. Actually, considering our performance level of more than four times the U-2 speed and three miles more operating altitude, it is probably much less risky than our first U-2 deployment. I think the time has come when the bird should leave its nest."

  The decision for the A-12 to "leave its nest" rested with the 303 Committee, the board that oversaw intelligence operations. On December 2, the 303 Committee received a formal request that the A-12 be deployed to Kadena.

  The committee refused but ordered that a quick-reaction capability be established. This would allow the A-12s to deploy within twenty-one days of an order, any time after January 1, 1966.

  The year ended on a sour note. On December 28, 1965, Vojvodich took off in Article 126 to make a check flight after major maintenance. Seven seconds after he left the ground, the plane went out of control. Vojvodich had no chance to deal with the problem and ejected at an altitude of 150 feet. He narrowly missed the fireball as Article 126 exploded, but he survived unharmed.[184]

  The accident investigation board found that a flight-line electrician had reversed the connections of the yaw and pitch gyros, which reversed the controls. CIA Director McCone ordered the Office of Security to investigate the possibility that it had been sabotage. No evidence was found, but they discovered the gyro manufacturer had earlier warned such an accident was possible. No action (such as color-coding the connections) had been taken on the warning. As with Park's crash the year before, no word leaked out about the accident.[185]

  Throughout 1966
, there were frequent requests to the 303 Committee to allow the A-12 to be deployed. The CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board all favored the move, while the State and Defense Departments opposed it. The A-12's supporters argued that there was an urgent need for intelligence data on any possible Chinese moves to enter the Vietnam War. Those opposed to deployment felt the need was not sufficient to justify the risks to the aircraft, and the political risks of basing it on Okinawa. Japan had powerful left-wing groups who were protest-ing U.S. involvement in Vietnam. On August 12, 1966, the disagreement was brought to President Johnson, who refused to approve deployment.

  As the 303 Committee debated, the Black Shield plan was further refined. The new plan cut the original twenty-one-day deployment time nearly in half. The first loads of personnel and equipment would leave Groom Lake for Kadena on the day deployment was approved. On the fifth day, the first A-12 would takeoff on the five-hour-and-thirty-four-minute, 6,673-mile flight. The second A-12 would follow on the seventh day, and the third on the ninth day. Two A-12s would be ready for an emergency overflight eleven days after approval was given. A normal mission could be flown after fifteen days. A Skylark mission over Cuba could be flown seven days after the go-ahead.

  The A-12 also showed what it could do. On the morning of December 21, 1966, Park took off from Groom Lake. He flew north to Yellowstone National Park; turned east to Bismark, North Dakota, and Duluth, Minnesota; then flew south to Atlanta, Georgia, and on to Tampa, Florida. He turned west, flying across the country to Portland, Oregon, then south to Nevada.

  He again turned east, flying to Denver, Colorado; St. Louis, Missouri; and Knoxville, Tennessee. He turned west, passing Memphis before finally landing back at Groom Lake. The flight covered 10,198 miles, involved four flights across the United States, several in-flight refuelings, and still had taken only six hours.[186]

  But following this success, the Oxcart program had its first fatal accident. On January 5, 1967, Walter Ray was flying a training mission in Article 125. As he descended, a fuel gauge malfunctioned, and the plane ran out of fuel about seventy miles from Groom Lake.[187] Ray ejected, but the seat separation device failed when his parachute pack became wedged against the head rest. He died when the seat hit the ground.[188]

  The air force made an announcement that an SR-71 on a routine test flight out of Edwards Air Force Base was missing and presumed down in Nevada. The pilot was described as a civilian test pilot, and newspapers assumed he was with Lockheed.[189] The wreckage was found on January 6, and Ray's body was recovered the next day. The A-12s were grounded pending an investigation of the fuel gauge and ejector seat failures.

  The third and final group of CIA A-12 pilots began training at Groom Lake in the spring of 1967. They were David P. Young, Francis J. Murray, and Russell J. Scott. Scott was an Air Force Test Pilot School graduate (Class 62C and ARPS IV) while the others came from operational backgrounds.[190]

  BLACK SHIELD

  In May of 1967, the roadblock to the Black Shield deployment finally ended. Fears began to grow that surface-to-surface missiles might be introduced into North Vietnam. Aggravating matters were concerns that conventional reconnaissance aircraft lacked the capability to detect such weapons.

  President Johnson requested a study of the matter. When told that the A-12's camera was far superior to those on the U-2, and that the plane was less vulnerable, State and Defense representatives who had opposed deployment began to reconsider. CIA Director Richard Helms submitted another proposal to the 303 Committee for A-12 deployment. He also raised the issue at President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch" on May 16. Johnson finally agreed to the deployment. The formal approval was made later that day. Black Shield was under way.[191]

  The airlift to Kadena began the next day. On May 22, the first A-12, Article 131, was flown by Vojvodich from Groom Lake to Kadena in six hours and six minutes. Layton piloted Article 127 to Kadena on May 24, while Article 129 with Weeks as pilot, left on May 26. Following a precau-tionary landing at Wake Island, it continued on the following day. By May 29, 1967, the A-12 Oxcarts were ready to make their first overflight. After ten years of work, it was time.

  Project Headquarters in Washington, D.C., had been monitoring the weather over North Vietnam. At the May 30 mission alert briefing, the weather was judged favorable, and the A-12 unit was ordered to make an overflight the next day. The alert message also contained the specific route it was to take. At Kadena, the message set events in motion. Vojvodich was selected as the primary A-12 pilot with Layton as the backup pilot. The two planes, a primary and backup A-12, were inspected, the systems were checked, and the camera was loaded with film. Like the CIA U-2s, these planes carried no national markings, only a black paint finish and a small five-digit serial number on the tail fins.

  Twelve hours before the planned takeoff time (H minus twelve), a second review of the weather was made. The forecast continued favorable, and the two pilots were given a detailed route briefing during the early evening. On the morning of May 31, the pilots received a final preflight briefing — the condition of the two aircraft was covered, last-minute weather and intelligence reviewed, and any changes in the flight plan gone over. At H minus two hours, a final "go-no-go" review of weather was made by headquarters.

  This covered not only North Vietnam, but the refueling areas and the take-off and landing sites. The only problem was at Kadena — it was raining heavily. Ironically, after all its testing, the A-12 had never flown in the rain.

  The target area weather was clear, however, and the decision was made to carry out the flight. A "go" message was sent to Kadena.

  With the final authorization, Vojvodich underwent a medical examination, got into his pressure suit, and was taken out to the primary aircraft, Article 131. If any problem appeared in the preflight checkout, the backup plane could be ready to make the overflight one hour later. Finally, with rain still falling, the A-12 taxied out, ignited its afterburner, and took off into the threatening skies.

  The first Black Shield mission made two passes. The first went over Haiphong and Hanoi and left North Vietnam's airspace near Dien Bien Phu.

  Vojvodich refueled over Thailand, then made a second pass over the Demilitarized Zone. The route covered 70 of the 190 known SAM sites, as well as 9 other primary targets. The photos were judged "satisfactory." The runs had been made at a speed of Mach 3.1 and an altitude of 80,000 feet.

  No radar signals were detected; the mission had gone unnoticed by the North Vietnamese and Chinese. The total flight time was three hours and forty minutes. Vojvodich needed three instrument approaches amid driving rain before landing back at Kadena.

  Between May 31 and July 15, a total of fifteen Black Shield missions were alerted. Of these, seven were flown. Four of the overflights detected radar-tracking signals, but none of the A-12s were fired on. By mid-July it was clear there were no surface-to-surface missiles in North Vietnam. The early overflights showed how good the A-12 was, and the hesitation to use it ended.

  Between August 16 and the end of the year, twenty-six missions were alerted and fifteen were flown. A typical Black Shield mission would involve an aerial refueling south of Okinawa soon after takeoff, one or two photo passes, and a second refueling over Thailand before the return to Kadena. Due to the plane's huge turning radius, some mission profiles required the A-12 to enter Chinese airspace. On a single-pass mission, the A-12 would spend only twelve and a half minutes over North Vietnam. If two passes were made, the A-12 would spend twenty-one and a half minutes in hostile airspace. Once back at Kadena, the exposed film would be unloaded and placed aboard a special plane for shipment to the processing facility. For the first overflights, this was the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, New York. By late summer, an air force processing center had been set up in Japan. The data would be in the hands of U.S. commanders within twenty-four hours of an overflight.

  Despite the speed and altitude of the A-12, the risks of overflights
were clear. On September 17, a SAM site tracked an A-12 with its acquisition radar. The Fan Song guidance radar was unable to gain a lock on the plane, however. On October 28, a North Vietnamese SAM site fired a single SA-2 at an A-12 flown by Sullivan. The plane's camera photographed the smoke from the site, then the missile's contrail. The ECM equipment worked well and the SAM missed.[192]

  Sullivan's next overflight, on October 30, 1967, resulted in a "hit." On his first pass, Sullivan noted the plane was being tracked, with two SAM sites preparing to fire. On the second pass, as he flew toward Hanoi from the east, the North Vietnamese were ready — at least six SA-2s were fired at the A-12. This was the first of many concerted efforts to bring down an A-12/SR-71. Sullivan saw contrails and the detonation of three missiles.[193]

  The bursts appeared, then seemed to collapse instantly as the A-12 sped away.[194] Unlike a tactical fighter, the A-12 could not evade a missile by maneuvering. The pilot had to continue on his course and trust the ECM equipment would protect him.[195]

  When Sullivan landed back at Kadena, a postflight inspection discovered a piece of metal had hit the lower right-wing fillet area and become lodged against the wing tank support structure. The fragment was not a warhead pellet, but a very small piece of the brass fuze from one of the missiles.

  This was the only hit scored on an A-12 or SR-71 in over one thousand overflights. Sullivan kept the fragment as a souvenir of the mission.