Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Read online

  The new year brought new crises, and the A-12 was in the midst of them.

  On January 23, 1968, the U.S.S. Pueblo was captured by the North Koreans.

  There were fears that this was the prelude to full-scale military action, and an A-12 overflight of North Korea was authorized. On January 25, the first attempt was made by Weeks, but a problem caused an abort shortly after takeoff. The next day, January 26, Murray took off. The mission was to locate the ship and then determine if an invasion of South Korea was about to occur. Murray made his first pass down the east coast of Korea: "As I approached Wonsan I could see the Pueblo through my view sight. The harbor was all iced up except at the very entrance and there she was, sitting off to the right of the main entrance."

  Murray made a total of four passes over North Korea, from the DMZ to the Yalu River, covering the entire country. The A-12 was tracked by the Chinese, but no missiles were fired. When the photos were analyzed, they showed no evidence that a ground attack was imminent.[196]

  A second overflight of North Korea was requested, but the State Department was reluctant, fearing political problems should the A-12 be shot down. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was briefed on the mission: the plane would spend only seven minutes over North Korea, and even if a problem occurred, it was highly unlikely the A-12 would land inside China or North Korea. Even so, Rusk suggested changes in the flight path before giving his approval. Rusk thus became the A-12's highest-ranking flight planner. (This was not unique; President Eisenhower had made changes in U-2 overflights.) The mission was flown by Layton on May 8, 1968.

  Between January 1 and March 31, 1968, four North Vietnamese overflights and one North Korean overflight were made (out of fifteen alerted).

  Between April 1 and June 9, 1968, two North Korean overflights were alerted; only the May 8 mission was flown. May 8 also was the last A-12 overflight. In all, the A-12 made twenty-six overflights of North Vietnam and two of North Korea. No overflights of China were made (although several flights did enter Chinese airspace during turns). No Skylark missions over Cuba were flown, as the U-2 proved adequate. Now, the A-12 Oxcart was to pass from the scene.[197]

  THE END OF OXCART

  Starting in November 1965, even as the A-12 was declared operational, doubts were expressed about the cost of operating the two separate groups of A-12s and SR-71s. After a year or more of debate, it was decided on January 10, 1967, to phase out the A-12 program. The first four A-12s were to be put in storage in July 1967, another two by December, and the final two by the end of January 1968. At the same time, the SR-71s would be phased into operation. This, it should be noted, was before the A-12 had undertaken a single overflight.

  Once the overflights began, the A-12 demonstrated an exceptional technical capability. As the scheduled phaseout date neared, concerns were expressed by high officials. Walt Rostow, the president's special assistant, members of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the president's Scientific Advisory Committee, and several congressmen all expressed doubts about the phaseout.

  In the meantime, SR-71s began arriving at Kadena, starting in early March 1968. The first SR-71 overflight of North Vietnam was made on March 21, 1968. By gradual stages, they took over the Black Shield mission, until the A-12 became the backup to the SR-71. After the final North Korean overflight on May 8, the unit was told to prepare to return home.

  Eight days after the final A-12 overflight, Defense Secretary Clark Clifford reaffirmed the phaseout decision. On May 21, President Johnson agreed that the A-12s would be put into storage. The aircraft at Groom Lake would be placed in storage at Palmdale by June 7. The A-12s at Kadena would be restricted to flight safety and pilot proficiency missions; June 8 was selected as the date they would return to the United States.[198]

  Virtually on the eve of the return, the A-12 program suffered its final loss. On June 4, 1968, Jack Weeks took off in Article 129 to make a check flight. An engine had been changed, and it had to be tested before the redeployment. Weeks was last heard from when the plane was 520 miles east of Manila. Then all contact was lost. No debris was found, nor was a cause ever determined. An air force press release identified the plane as an SR-71.

  A few days later, the final two A-12s returned to Groom Lake. The final A-12 flight was made on June 21, 1968, when Article 131 took off from the Ranch. Frank Murray landed it thirty-five minutes later at Palmdale. The first A-12 to make an overflight, and the last to fly, had its fuel and oil drained. It was then placed in storage. The Oxcart story had ended.[199]

  On June 26, 1968, an awards ceremony was held at Groom Lake. Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, deputy director of Central Intelligence, presented the CIA's Intelligence Star for courageous action to Kenneth S. Collins, Ronald J. Layton, Francis J. Murray, Dennis B. Sullivan, Mel Vojvodich, and, posthumously, to Jack C. Weeks, for their roles in the Black Shield missions. Weeks's widow accepted his award. Colonel Hugh C. Slater, commander of the Kadena detachment, and his deputy, Col. Maynard N. Amundson, received the Air Force Legion of Merit. The 1129th Special Activities Squadron and its support units received the U.S. Air Force Out-standing Unit Award. The wives of the pilots were also present and learned for the first time just what their husbands had been doing for the past several years.[200]

  Although the Oxcart was gone, its descendant, the SR-71, would continue to fly intelligence missions for the next twenty-two years. It covered trouble spots such as North Vietnam, North Korea, the Mideast, Libya, kept watch on Eastern European borders, and tracked Soviet submarines. Finally, in 1990, the SR-71 was retired. Like the A-12, the reason was cost. The surviving A-12s and SR-71s were originally to be scrapped, but the air force relented, and they were sent to museums.

  The A-12 was the most exotic Dark Eagle ever built. No other Black airplane has posed so great an aerodynamic and engineering challenge. The A-12 was the final expression of a trend that had been under way since World War I — aircraft trying to evade air defenses by going higher and faster. This was true of the B-17s and B-29s of World War II. As the Cold War began, B-47s, B-52s, and British V-bombers flew at 50,000 feet and near supersonic speeds. The B-58 raised this to supersonic speeds, while the U-2 could reach altitudes of 70,000-plus feet.

  It was the Soviet SA-2 SAM that brought this era to a close. Bombers would now have to attack at low altitudes — a few hundred feet above the ground. The Mach 3 XB-70 was canceled, while the B-58's service life was cut short.

  The A-12 was the last of its line. The Oxcart was so much faster, flew so much higher, and had a reduced radar return. The combination of these factors resulted in an airplane that was unstoppable. For so critical a mission, it was possible to justify so expensive and specialized an aircraft.

  But there were other trends in Black reconnaissance aircraft.

  CHAPTER 4

  Alone, Unarmed, Unafraid, and Unmanned

  The Model 147 Lightning Bug

  Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient.

  Sun Tzu ca. 400 B.C.

  Black reconnaissance aircraft, such as the U-2 or A-12, faced two basic problems. The first was technical — to build an aircraft with altitude and speed performance superior to enemy air defenses. The second proved more difficult — to convince the president that the risks of a plane being lost and the pilot being captured were acceptable. Reconnaissance pilots said they flew their missions, "Alone, Unarmed, Unafraid." During the 1960s and early 1970s, a series of Dark Eagles added "Unmanned" to this motto.

  These drones were used to cover targets that were too heavily defended, or too politically sensitive, to risk a manned reconnaissance aircraft.

  BEGINNINGS, 1959–1962

  As with the U-2, the effort began small. In September 1959, Col. Harold L. Wood, chief of the Reconnaissance Division at Air Force Headquarters, and his deputy, Lt. Col. Lloyd M. Ryan, met with Raymond A. Ballweg Jr., vice-president of Hycon Manufacturing Company, which made the U-2s'

  cameras. The conversation
came around to the risk of manned reconnaissance. Ballweg responded, "Hell, Lloyd, why don't you have us install a camera in a jet target drone? No reason it can't be programmed to do the recon job for you and bring back pictures." Colonels Wood and Ryan asked,

  "What drone?" Ballweg explained that Ryan Aeronautical Company built the Q-2C Firebee jet-powered target drone, which might be usable.

  Several weeks later, Lieutenant Colonel Ryan made a call to Ryan Aeronautical to suggest a meeting. At first there seemed little interest in a photo reconnaissance Firebee; finally, an agreement was reached for Ryan Aero-83 nautical and Hycon to do a joint study. As with other Black airplane projects, a small group would conduct the effort. On January 21, 1960, Robert R. Schwanhausser was named to head the reconnaissance drone group. He was told to take six or eight people and get started. Schwanhausser was reluctant, saying, "I don't see much future in the reconnaissance drone stuff."

  Setting to work, he estimated the Firebee's range could be extended to allow it to make overflights from the Barents Sea, across the Soviet Union, to a recovery in Turkey. With longer wings, the drone could reach altitudes above that of the regular Firebee. The drone would also have a reduced radar return, making it virtually undetectable. Launch would be from either a C-130 transport plane or a ground launcher.[201]

  In mid-April 1960, the Reconnaissance Panel of the air staff was briefed on the project. Two weeks later, Powers's U-2 was lost. On July 1, 1960, an RB-47 on an ELINT flight over international waters was shot down — only two of the six-man crew survived, and they were captured.

  On July 8, the air force issued a $200,000 contract. Ryan Aeronautical made reflective measurements of one-fourth and one-eighth scale models of the Firebee. These showed the radar return could be reduced by putting a wire screen over the intake, painting the nose with nonconductive paint, and placing radar-absorbing blankets on the sides of the drone.

  This was confirmed by the flight-test program, which was conducted between September 16 and October 12, 1960, at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico. The tests showed the radar return of a drone at 50,000 feet could be reduced without causing aerodynamic problems. A cover story was also created should one of the modified drones come down outside the Holloman test range: the drone was a "Q-2D," a "ground-controlled target" used to test SAM missiles at altitudes of 60,000 feet. This would conceal its true reconnaissance role.

  The test data was to be used for Ryan's proposed Model 136 reconnaissance drone. It used long, straight wings, a horizontal stabilizer with inward-tilted rudders at their tips, and a jet engine mounted on top of the airframe to reduce the radar and infrared signatures. Both the test flights and the Model 136 were code-named "Red Wagon." (A Boeing design was called "Blue Scooter.")

  As with Bell and Lockheed, Ryan set up its own Black production facility for the reconnaissance drone program, in a warehouse on Frontier Street in San Diego, California. The people needed for the effort were recruited without being told what they would be doing. Only after arriving at the warehouse did they learn the project dealt with drone reconnaissance.

  Behind the scenes, there was considerable debate over the future of reconnaissance programs. The end of Red Wagon came on election day 1960.

  President John F. Kennedy and the Democrats would have their own ideas about reconnaissance, so any new projects were put on hold.

  Despite this, interest remained in drone reconnaissance. Ryan Aeronautical proposed a new system called "Lucy Lee" (also "L Squared"). It was to undertake photo and ELINT missions outside Soviet airspace. Lucy Lee would use a modified Firebee rear fuselage, long straight wings, and a new forward fuselage with an intake above the nose. It would fly at altitudes between 65,000 and 72,000 feet, and the radar return of Lucy Lee would be reduced. Ryan Aeronautical also proposed that $500,000 be used to modify a standard Firebee drone to a reconnaissance configuration.

  By mid-summer 1961, it seemed Lucy Lee would succeed. Then, despite support at nearly every level, the project was canceled in January 1962.

  Work at the warehouse ground to a halt; it was down to "one light bulb, one engineer, one secretary, and a guard." Finally, Ryan Aeronautical management issued orders to close down the warehouse.[202]

  A half hour later, the air force called.

  147A FIRE FLY

  The air force had accepted the Ryan Aeronautical proposal for a modified Firebee reconnaissance drone. Rather than an expensive, all-new drone, and the unknown this involved, the proven Firebee would be used. The money came from a program called "Big Safari," which had been established in the early 1950s as a means to modify existing aircraft for reconnaissance missions in a very short time. On February 2, 1962, a $1.1 million contract was issued to Ryan to modify four Firebee target drones as "special purpose aircraft." Code-named "Fire Fly," the Model 147A drones were to have a 1,200-mile range, a cruising altitude over 55,000 feet, and a photo resolution of two feet. They were to be ready by May 15.

  The first 147A drone was to be a standard Firebee with a simple guidance system — a timer-programmer and an MA-1 gyro compass. (A telephone step-per switch was used which cost $17.) The other three 147As were "stretched" with a thirty-five-inch plug added to the fuselage. This carried an additional sixty-eight gallons of fuel. The nose was also modified to carry a camera.

  Again to speed things up, the optics from a U-2 were borrowed, and mounted in a homebuilt frame. Due to security reasons, it was not called a camera but rather a "scorer." The test program would use two of the drones—147A-l would test the navigation systems, while the stretched 147A-2 would check out the camera and other modifications. Once the system was proven, the other two 147A drones would be placed on alert for deployment in a crisis.

  The first flights of 147A-1 were made from Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, in April. In its first off-range flight, the drone flew from Holloman to the Wendover Air Force Range, Utah, and then back to the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, without any commands from the B-57 chase plane or the ground station. In all, three flights of 147A-1 were made to prove out the navigation system. This was followed by four test flights of the 147A-2 drone in late April and early May. When the film from the scorer was developed, it showed very good resolution. The Fire Fly had an adequate range, an altitude and resolution better than required, and the ability to fly the desired track.

  With this, the 147A reconnaissance drones were considered operational.

  Two drones and their DC-130 launch aircraft were placed on seventy-two-hour alert at Holloman. This very limited capability was operated by the Strategic Air Command (SAC).[203]

  In the summer of 1962, it was decided to run a simulated deployment to test the drones under operational conditions. The operational test and evaluation would involve two reconnaissance flights over the Atlantic Missile Range at Cape Canaveral and three "live-fire" tests at MacDill Air Force Base. During the two reconnaissance flights, fighters swarmed aloft in simulated interceptions; they ended up chasing each other. The radar blankets around the drone were effective, and ground radar never picked it up.

  The live-fire tests at MacDill also showed the 147A's low radar return, small size, high altitude, and subsonic speed combined to make it highly survivable. The drone's main problem was the contrail — a giant banner that gave away the drone's location. (Neither of the two successful shoot downs would have been possible without the contrail as guide.) A "no-con" (no contrail) program was quickly started to find means to suppress it. It was eventually decided that a chemical agent would be added to the exhaust.[204]

  As the no-con program began at Tyndall Air Force Base, events were unfolding that would bring the world to the brink of nuclear war, and Fire Fly to within moments of making an operational mission.

  THE MISSILES OF OCTOBER

  For several years, CIA U-2s had been directed against Communist Cuba. The missions of August 29 and September 5, 1962, revealed a major change — the Soviets had introduced SA-2 SAMs. Eleven sites, which covered
most of the island, were found. The risks of Cuban overflights had increased.[205]

  The dangers were underlined four days later. Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilots had been conducting overflights of mainland China since late 1960, making as many as three overflights per month. On September 9, Radio Peking announced: "A U.S.-made U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance plane of the Chiang Kai-shek gang was shot down this morning by an Air Force unit of the Chinese People's Liberation Army when it intruded over east China."

  The pilot, Col. Chen Huai Sheng, was severely injured when his U-2 was hit by an SA-2. He was captured and taken to a hospital but died that night.[206]

  Secretary of State Dean Rusk and presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy were worried about the political effects of a U-2 being shot down over Cuba. Rusk seemed obsessed with the idea that continued U-2 overflights would increase tensions to the point of war.[207] At a September 20 meeting, the air force proposed that the Fire Fly drones be used over Cuba. No interest was expressed in their use. At that time, there were only two drones and they were still in the test phase.

  By early October, there had been no U-2 coverage of the interior of Cuba for a month. Finally, a single U-2 overflight of western Cuba was authorized. Unlike previous U-2 missions, it would be flown by an air force pilot. Two SAC U-2 pilots, Majors Richard S. Heyser and Rudolf Anderson, were checked out in the CIA's U-2F version.

  At 8:30 P.M. PST on October 13, Heyser took off from North Base at Edwards and headed toward Cuba. He started his run over Cuba at 7:31 A.M. EST, October 14. The overflight was made at 72,500 feet, with a flight path that went south to north across the island. At 7:43 A.M., he left Cuban airspace and turned toward McCoy Air Force Base. After landing, the film was removed and flown to Washington, D.C., for analysis at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).[208]

  The following day, interpreters noticed six long canvas-covered objects in the San Cristobal area. They were about seventy feet long — too large to be SA-2s. They were identified as SS-4 Sandal medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Three MRBM sites under construction were discovered — at San Cristobal, Los Palacios, and San Diego de los Banos. The Cuban Missile Crisis had begun.[209]