Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Read online

  The 147SCs were to provide "prisoner verification" and "positive identification of the enemy order of battle" — whether the POWs were at the camp, and the defenses in the area. Tragically, the drones went through another bad streak of losses. At least two were shot down, and another four had mechanical failure. The final drone, on July 12, suffered an even more frustrating failure. Two of the POWs, air force Lt. Col. Elmo C. Baker and Capt. Larry E. Carrigan, saw it coming and started waving. The drone was supposed to show "the height, color, eyes, and facial expressions" of every man in the compound, but the programmer was slightly off; the drone banked a moment too early and the photos showed only the horizon.

  Because too many drones flying over so isolated a site would tip off the North Vietnamese, it was decided to switch to SR-71s. The data they brought back was ambiguous — the camp was not as active as before, but there did seem to be someone there. The raid was given a go-ahead.[281]

  It started at 2:18 A.M. on November 21, 1970, when an HH-53 helicopter flew over the camp and blasted the guard towers and a guard barracks with minigun fire. Moments later, an HH-3 crash-landed inside the compound with the assault team. They quickly secured the camp and killed the remaining guards. Two more HH-53s with troops landed outside the camp; a third HH-53 mistook another set of buildings four hundred yards away for the camp and landed there. After a short but fierce firefight, the helicopter picked up the troops and flew them to the camp. The raid took only twenty-seven minutes, but no American POWs were found. Unknown to U.S. intelligence, the POWs had been moved out of Son Tay.[282]

  COMING OUT OF THE BLACK

  In July 1971, the world's political landscape profoundly changed — President Richard M. Nixon announced he would be making a trip to Communist China. Soon after, it was reported that the United States was suspending overflights of China.

  As the political situation eased, so did the shroud of secrecy that had enveloped the drones. Since the first loss of a 147 drone in November 1964, the U.S. government had held to a strict "no comment" policy. During 1970-71, this began to change. The November 9, 1970, issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology carried an article on the drones, based on off-the-record information. By the spring of 1971, the air force allowed release of photos of the 147 drones and a very general statement that the Air Force had developed drones that could be used for reconnaissance. What still could not be discussed were code names, technical details, or any references to operational missions. These were still Black.

  The year 1971 saw an increase in drone activity, with a total of 406 missions. Unlike previous years, which had seen a host of different 147 versions, only three types of drones were flown. There were 277 SC missions, 120 TE flights, and the final nine 147Hs.[283]

  In the war itself, there was little movement. The peace talks, both the public ones in Paris and secret discussions conducted by presidential adviser Henry Kissinger, were deadlocked. The number of U.S. troops declined, even as the antiwar movement grew. The North Vietnamese had used the respite to rebuild and prepare for a ground invasion of the South. As 1971 ended, it was becoming clear that would not be far off.

  LINEBACKER I

  The drone operation was the first to reflect the impending North Vietnamese invasion. In late December 1971, the sortie rate of SC drones increased to 1.2 per day, twice what it had been. On March 20, 1972, the Easter Offensive was launched. On May 8, Haiphong Harbor was mined, cutting off the North's main source of supply. The Linebacker I bombing campaign began, hitting such targets as bridges, barracks, barges, and rail lines.

  With the North Vietnamese invasion, the drones were launched at an average rate of nearly two per day. Some days saw as many as five launches, with nine drone missions flown over a three-day period. This was far higher than during Rolling Thunder. The 147SC drones covered areas that were denied to manned reconnaissance aircraft as too dangerous. This included not only Hanoi and Haiphong, but all of North Vietnam and even occupied areas of South Vietnam.[284]

  As the bombing continued during the summer and fall, a new version of the 147SC was introduced. The SC/TV was first flown in June 1972. As the name suggests, this was a standard SC fitted with a television camera. The images were transmitted to a controller aboard the DC-130. He would then guide the drone over the target. This made it possible to cover exactly that part of a target needed. On one SC/TV mission, eight out of nine targets were covered and three bonus targets were also spotted, this despite visibility of down to two miles.[285]

  SPECIAL MISSIONS — THE LITTERBUG AND COMPASS COOKIE

  The following month the last of the 147N family began combat operations. The 147NC had an unusual history. It originally was built for dropping radar-jamming chaff and had been operated by the tactical air command for several years. It had not, however, been sent to Vietnam. The chaff was carried in two external pods. It was realized the pods could also carry propaganda leaflets over North Vietnam.

  Between July and December 1972, twenty-eight missions were flown by the 147NC drones. The biggest problem faced by the drones was predicting the wind over the target at the time of the drop. The leaflets would drift on the wind after release. Several missions were ineffective because the winds carried the leaflets away from the target. The project's official name was "Litterbug." The working troops called the drones "bullshit bombers."

  In September 1972, a final series of four 147H missions was flown. The cameras were replaced with ELINT equipment. As with the United Effort missions of 1965-66, the purpose of this special project, called "Compass Cookie," was to gain radar and fuze data on the SA-2. A number of new versions had been introduced since 1966, and the mission would provide an update. The September 28 mission was fired on by three SA-2s but transmitted the data before being destroyed.[286]

  LINEBACKER II

  By the fall, a peace agreement seemed complete. Nixon ordered a bombing halt above the twentieth parallel on October 24, while Kissinger declared, "Peace is at hand." The final details proved elusive, however. The North Vietnamese reopened several issues and finally broke off talks on December 13. Five days later, B-52s began hitting targets in Hanoi and Haiphong in tlie most intense air campaign in history. Linebacker ll became known as the Eleven-Day War. The B-52s took heavy losses, but devastated airfields, factories, railyards, warehouses, and SAM sites.

  Linebacker II saw the drone's heaviest use of the entire war. Between December 20, 1972, and January 19, 1973, over 100 missions were flown.

  Two-thirds of these were bomb damage assessment (BDA) missions in support of the B-52 strikes. The photos showed the targets were turned into cratered moonscapes. The drones also photographed POW camps in the Hanoi area. Throughout the war, POWs had seen or heard the drones many times. During the 1968-72 bombing halt, they were one of the few things sustaining the prisoners' morale.

  The final B-52 strikes were flown on December 29, 1972. Following a New Year's halt, bombing was restricted to below the twentieth parallel. On January 15, 1973, agreement was reached and all bombing of North Vietnam stopped. It was announced that reconnaissance flights would continue over North Vietnam. They would be conducted by SR-71s and low-altitude drones. One Pentagon official said, "The use of pilotless drones is no change and is one method we have used whenever bombing missions over North Vietnam have been halted." It was as close to an official acknowledgment as had been made. The final flight before the cease-fire went into effect was a 147SC/TV, dubbed "The Last Picture Show." A total of 570 drone missions had been launched in 1972. Of this, 466 were SC drones (52 were lost), while the 147TEs amounted to a mere 69 flights.[287]

  AFTERMATH

  The cease-fire agreement was signed on January 27, 1973. The drones were placed on a "hold/standby" status. This lasted only five days. Operations resumed with a pair of flights on February 5. The following day, the first of a series of SC/TV missions was launched. Policing the cease-fire was nearly as demanding as Linebacker had been: 444 drone missions were launched in 1973.


  The year saw the debut of the final two members of the 147S family, the 147SD and SDL. The SD was designed with an improved navigation system with an accuracy of 1.1 miles per 100 miles. (The SC's accuracy was 3 percent.) The SD also had an improved radar altimeter, a new cooling system to cope with low-altitude flight in hot tropical weather, and external tanks to extend the range. The first 147SD mission was flown in June.

  The other was the SDL. This was a 147SD equipped with a Loran radio-navigation system, which provided even greater accuracy. The first two missions had actually been flown in August 1972, but both were lost. The cause was traced to interference from the navigation system. Normally, the drone would bank up to a maximum angle. Once at this point, the guidance system would not accept any further bank commands. It was found that the Loran was generating an override signal to the roll control; the bank angle increased and the drone went out of control.

  Survivability of these last-generation drones was also phenomenal. By November of 1973 there had been 100 launches without a loss. The 147SC drones were designed for an average lifetime of two and a half missions each. They would far surpass this. The record holder was "Tom Cat," with 68 missions, each covering an average of twelve targets. The runners-up were "Budweiser" (63 missions), "Ryan's Daughter" (52 missions), and "Baby Buck" (46 missions). A 147SC/TV flew 42 missions, an SD made 39, while an SDL made 36 missions.

  The final eighteen months of drone operations — between 1974 and early June 1975—saw a total of 518 flights. From the start, it was discovered that the North Vietnamese were violating the peace agreement. Troops, tanks, and SAMs poured into the South. The United States, its spirit broken by the war and increasingly obsessed with the Watergate scandal, was both unwilling and unable to do more than issue feeble protests.

  By early 1975, the North Vietnamese began their final offensive. The South Vietnamese army was driven back, while the U.S. Congress cut off all aid. By late April, Saigon was surrounded. The United States began an evacuation, and South Vietnamese aircraft and helicopters began to flee.

  The final 147S-series mission was flown on April 30, 1975—the day Saigon fell.

  With the fall of Saigon, the 147SC and SD drones were put into storage.

  The 147TF drones continued a little longer. The final flight was made on June 2, 1975. Then they, too, were stored. Although some in Congress objected to the loss of so valuable a capability, the decision stood.

  The story of the Model 147 drones was an amazing chapter in the history of U.S. Black aircraft. Using the existing Firebee drone gave it flexibility, while new versions were developed on a short-time scale at low cost. The result was a reconnaissance capability that was unmatched by manned aircraft. In all, 3,435 drone missions were flown against Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Of these, 1,651 were by 147SC drones. A total of about 1,000 147SC drones were built, in nineteen different versions.

  A total of 578 drones were lost—251 were confirmed kills, the vast majority to North Vietnamese air defenses. Another 80 were possible losses to enemy action, 53 were lost in the recovery sequence, 30 in retrieval, and the remainder in other ways.[288] The drones survived the heaviest air defenses built up to that time. One drone had an SA-2 explode within twenty to thirty feet of it and still made it home. One of the high-altitude drones evaded eight MiG intercepts, three air-to-air missile firings, and nine SA-2 launches.[289]

  Their accomplishments were many and varied. They had provided the first photographs of North Vietnamese SA-2 construction, MiG 21s, and helicopters; arming and fuze data on the SA-2; and the only low-altitude BDA coverage of Linebacker. The total number of photos they took, over areas too physically or politically dangerous for manned aircraft, is estimated to be 145 million.

  The photos these Dark Eagles brought back cast a long shadow. For more than a decade after the defeat in Vietnam, the images of collapse and failure raised doubts about the ability and even competence of the U.S. military. In the years to follow, it was depicted as unable to win and equipped with weapons that did not work.

  Until another Dark Eagle, and a night of thunder.

  CHAPTER 5

  Orphaned Eagle

  The Model 154 Firefly

  … of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are long and some short, and the Moon waxes and wanes.

  Sun Tzu ca. 400 B.C.

  Despite the failures of the Model 136 and Lucy Lee proposals to gain approval, Ryan Aeronautical remained interested in an advanced drone. There was only so much growth in the basic Firebee airframe. Also, a greater altitude and range, as well as further reductions in radar cross section, would need a completely new design.

  The target area for the advanced drone was Communist China. The nuclear test site at Lop Nor, as well as the reactors and reprocessing plants, were beyond the reach of the 147 drones. Even the U-2s were hard-pressed to cover these targets. The losses suffered by Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilots made a long-range drone program that much more attractive.

  HATCHING THE FIREFLY

  With most of Ryan's efforts directed toward the 147 program, work on the advanced drone remained at a low level. Understanding how shape affected radar return was one major area of study. Unlike the 147 drones, which relied on radar-absorbing blankets, the new design would use shape to make it hard to detect. From time to time, the advanced drone was proposed to the air force, but a place could not be found for it in their plans or funding.

  The CIA expressed an interest to Ryan about developing a separate drone program, and a formal proposal was put together. It was given the designation Model 150 "Red Book." Ryan felt uncomfortable about going "behind the back" of the air force with the proposal, and told the CIA that if they did not respond within thirty days, Ryan would feel free to deal with the air force. Within a week the CIA rejected the Model 150 proposal, suggesting Ryan talk to the air force about the project. The CIA had its own, very different, drone project.

  Ryan renamed the project "Blue Book," which sounded better and was less suggestive of a project aimed at Communist China. The Model 150 was also revised to the Model 151 through the Model 154 designs. After several years of work and proposals, Ryan felt the time was right for a major effort.

  This included a formal briefing at SAC Headquarters by the company's founder, T. Claude Ryan. By this time, the 147G drones were conducting overflights of China, and the 147H was beginning development, so the presentation was successful. Because this was a whole new aircraft, rather than a simple conversion of an existing target drone, a design competition was started.

  The competition pitted North American Aviation against Ryan. North American had set up a separate division to undertake drone work. Additionally, Northrop tried to enter the emerging competition, but the air force refused its proposal. The range and altitude requirements for the drone were similar to what Ryan had proposed, and the company felt confident its design would be selected. North American put up a strong challenge, and for a time it seemed likely to win. Ryan emerged victorious, however, and won the development contract in June 1966.[290]

  THE MODEL 154 FIREFLY

  The new drone was called the Model 154 Firefly. The fuselage resembled that of the Model 136, with the engine over the fuselage and inward-canted fins. The sloped, flat sides were designed with reduced radar return in mind.

  The fins were tilted inward to both reduce radar return and shield the exhaust. Much of the airframe was made of plastic, which also absorbed radar signals. Infrared suppression was provided by placing the engine above the fuselage and mixing the hot exhaust with cool intake air. Active ECM equipment would provide further protection.

  The total length was 34.2 feet, while the swept-back wings spanned 47.68 feet. The 154 had a maximum altitude between 72,000 and 78,000 feet. As with the 147 drones, it would be launched by a DC-130 and recovered in midair by a helicopter. It was equipped with a KA-80A camera able to provide coverage along a 1,720-mile strip. A highly precise doppler-inertial system
handled the navigation. Due to the sensitive onboard equipment, the 154 was also to be fitted with a destruct system on operational missions. In every aspect, it pushed the state of the art in drone technology.

  It was not surprising that the 154 program was soon behind schedule.

  The major problem was the guidance system, which was supposed to be accurate to 5 miles per 1,000 miles flown. The system had five different operating modes. Even if it suffered a complete failure, the drone could still automatically fly to a recovery zone. It was soon clear that everyone had been overly optimistic. The project was also overmanaged. Unlike the streamlined Big Safari management, as many as two hundred people attended the monthly progress meetings.[291]

  The first 154s were delivered in early 1968. A total of twenty-eight Model 154 drones was produced. This consisted of one static test vehicle (STV), two captive test vehicles (CTV), five flight test vehicles (FTV), and twenty production vehicles, numbered P-l through P-20.

  The initial tests included both captive flights aboard the DC-130 launch aircraft and tests of separation characteristics and recovery parachute operations. The first powered flight was made on September 10, 1968, at Holloman Air Force Base. The early free flights were restricted to the White Sands Missile Range and tested aerodynamics, performance, and stability.

  Starting in 1969, testing picked up. A total of forty-two free flights were made, including long-range flights from White Sands to Utah and back again. Between April and July, four Model 154 drones were lost due to control problems and recovery accidents.[292]

  To this point, the Model 154 Firefly, like the 147 drones, was a Black project. That changed on August 4, 1969.