Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Page 6

  The U-2's time in England was brief. At the same time the unit was being set up, a British frogman died while investigating the hull of a Soviet cruiser in an English harbor. The resulting press furor caused Prime Minister Anthony Eden to withdraw permission for the U-2 to operate from Lakenheath. Bissell and General Cabell then went to see West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. He said, "This is a wonderful idea. It's just what ought to be done." He gave permission to use an old Luftwaffe base fifty miles east of Wiesbaden. The four U-2s and the seven pilots moved to the new base. The unit was called "Detachment A."[74]

  The first public word of the U-2's existence came with a May 7, 1956, press release from the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). It announced: "Start of a new research program [using a] new airplane, the Lockheed U-2… expected to reach 10-mile-high altitudes as a matter of routine… The availability of a new type of airplane… helps to obtain the needed data… about gust-meteorological conditions to be found at high altitude… in an economical and expeditious manner." Specific areas of research included clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind sheer, the jet stream, ozone, and water vapor. "The first data, covering conditions in the Rocky Mountain area," the press release said, "are being obtained from flights from Watertown Strip, Nevada."

  On July 9, NACA issued a second press release titled, "High Altitude Research Program Proves Valuable." It stated:

  Initial data about gust-meteorological conditions to be found at 10-mile altitudes which have been obtained to date by the relatively few flights of the Lockheed U-2 airplane have already proven the value of the aircraft for this purpose…

  "Within recent weeks, preliminary data-gathering flights have been made from an Air Force base at Lakenheath, England… As the program continues, flights will be made in other parts of the world."[75]

  Indeed, the U-2 had been making flights that provided highly valuable data. But the data was not about the weather.

  In the early summer, the CIA sought Eisenhower's agreement to begin overflights. At this point, the project was seen as a short-term, high-risk operation.[76] The U-2s were also considered too delicate to have a long-operating lifetime. The desperate need for intelligence outweighed the risks.[77]

  Eisenhower initially authorized two test overflights of Eastern Europe.[78]

  The first was made on June 20, 1956. Carl Overstreet was selected to be the first pilot to take the U-2 into "denied" airspace. The route went to Warsaw, Poland, then over Berlin and Potsdam, East Germany. Following the two overflights, Eisenhower was shown a number of photo briefing boards from the missions. At the same time, the Soviets put on another mass flyby of bombers.

  On July 2, Bissell sent a request to begin Soviet overflights to Eisenhower's personal assistant Gen. Andrew Goodpaster. The following day, Goodpaster sent word that Eisenhower had authorized overflights of the USSR for a ten-day period. Bissell asked if this meant ten days of good weather. Goodpaster replied, "It means ten days from when you start."[79]

  At 6:00 A. M. on July 4, 1956, Hervey Stockman took off in U-2 Article 347. The plane carried the A camera and was in a bare-metal finish with no national markings. Stockman headed over East Berlin and northern Poland via Poznan, then crossed the Soviet border. The overflight covered a number of bomber bases in the western USSR, as far east as Minsk. The Soviets made more than twenty intercept attempts. The camera photographed MiG fighters trying to reach the U-2's altitude, only to have their engines flame out. Stockman then turned north, toward Leningrad. Once he reached the city, he turned west and flew along the Baltic coast. The U-2 landed back at Wiesbaden after an eight-hour-forty-five-minute flight.

  The next overflight would go directly to Moscow. When asked to justify such a dangerous target, the mission planners told Bissell, "Let's go for the big one straight away. We're safer the first time than we'll ever be again."

  Article 347 took off at 5:00 A.M. on July 5. The pilot was Carmen Vito.

  The flight path was farther south than the first mission — over Kracow, Poland, then due east to Kiev, then north to Minsk. There was heavy cloud cover, which started to clear as Vito turned toward Moscow. Again, MiGs tried to reach the U-2. Several crashed when they were unable to recover after flaming out. Over Moscow, a new danger loomed — the SA-1 Guild surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites that ringed the capital. Vito could see several "herring bone" shaped sites, but no missiles were fired. Vito flew back along the Baltic coast to Wiesbaden.[80]

  In all, five overflights were made during the first series — one on July 4, and two each on July 5 and 9. Their photos were highly illuminating. The bomber airfields in the western USSR had been equipped with nuclear weapons loading pits, but no Mya-4 bombers were spotted. Within weeks, the bomber gap controversy was over. The U-2 photos had proven the Soviets did not have a large bomber force. The photos brought a revolution in intelligence. It was now possible to know, not to estimate, not guess, but to know the military capabilities of an enemy. That was the most important accomplishment of the Angel of Paradise Ranch.

  On July 10, the Soviets protested the overflights, and Eisenhower decided to halt the missions for the time being. He was very impressed, however, with the photos of bomber bases and the shipyards around Leningrad.[81]

  In September 1956, the second group of U-2 pilots completed training at the Ranch. The seven pilots of Detachment B were based at Incirlik, Turkey.

  From there, the southern Soviet Union, as well as targets throughout the Mideast, could be covered. It was not until November that the first overflights were made from Turkey, a pair of short overflights to examine Soviet air defenses. The first was flown by Powers.

  The third group, Detachment C, was established in early 1957 at Atsugi, Japan. The unit made overflights of targets in the eastern USSR, such as Vladivostok and Sakhalin Island, as well as flying missions over China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Indonesia.[82]

  The year 1957 saw a step-up in overflight activities. This represented a change in attitude toward the operation. Eisenhower had come to rely on the U-2 photos, comparing other intelligence data to them. Soon they were providing 90 percent of the intelligence on the Soviet Union. Instead of a short-term project, it had become an open-ended one. Fears about the U-2's fragile structure had eased and early problems with the B camera had also been overcome. Detachment A in Germany was closed down and combined with the Turkish-based Detachment B.

  The risks were also clearer; a year after the first overflight, Bissell asked for a special estimate of the U-2's vulnerability. The Soviets had begun deployment of a new SAM, the SA-2 Guideline, in late 1956. The study concluded the SA-2 could reach the U-2's altitude, but they had been designed to hit much lower-flying B-47s and B-52s. Above 60,000 feet, the SAM's accuracy was so poor only a lucky hit could be made. The risk was not a serious one.[83]

  A primary target of the overflights was Soviet ballistic missile activities.

  Since World War II, the Soviets had undertaken an aggressive development program. The SS-3 and SS-4 medium range ballistic missiles, then in the final stages of testing, could threaten U.S. bases throughout Western Europe, North Africa, and Asia. It was the U-2 that provided the first good photos of the Kapustin Yar test site on the Volga River.

  A new missile threat was also emerging. Development work was under way on the R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). A new test site, in Soviet central Asia, was completed in late 1956. In March 1957, the prototype R-7 was undergoing checkout. The missile was fired on May 15 but exploded fifty seconds after launch. Two more launch attempts were made in the spring and summer, also ending in failure.

  These activities were detected, and Eisenhower authorized a series of overflights to find the launch site. These overflights were along the main railroad lines. During one of them, the pilot spotted construction in the distance and altered course to photograph it. When the photos were developed, they showed the launch pad. Within days, the analysis was completed. The site was named
"Tyuratam," after the rail stop at the end of the fifteen-mile spur that connected the site to the main Moscow-Tashkent line.

  The string of R-7 failures ended on August 21, 1957, when the fourth attempt made a successful 3,500-nautical-mile flight. A second successful R-7 launch followed on September 7. Emboldened by the twin flights, Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev authorized the launching of an earth satellite by an R-7. This was Sputnik 1, orbited on October 4, 1957.

  Sputnik 2, which carried a dog named Laika, followed on November 3.[84]

  The R-7 and Sputnik launches showed the Soviets had achieved a breakthrough in rocket technology. Estimates began to appear that the Soviets would deploy their ICBMs, which had been given the NATO code name SS-6 Sapwood, in huge numbers. If true, the United States would be vulnerable to a surprise nuclear attack. So began the "missile gap" controversy. Unlike the bomber gap, this new intelligence question was not so easily answered.

  The Soviet Union was vast. Even with the use of bases in Iran, Pakistan, and Norway, many areas were out of the U-2's range. Another factor was Eisenhower's growing reluctance to authorize overflights. He feared that large numbers of such flights would provoke the Soviets, possibly starting World War III.[85]

  What overflights were authorized concentrated on Soviet rail lines. Because of the SS-6's huge size, it could only be moved by rail, and any operational sites would also be located near rail lines. The problem was the U-2s were failing to bring back any photos of deployment. No ICBMs were spotted in transit, nor were any operational sites found. Despite this lack of evidence, the air force continued to insist that the Soviets would deploy large numbers of SS-6s.

  Eisenhower was increasingly frustrated. From the U-2 photos, he knew Soviet nuclear forces were a pale shadow of those of the United States, but without evidence of the true SS-6 deployment rate, he was attacked as downplaying the Soviet threat in order to balance the budget. To aggravate matters, Khrushchev was using the missile gap and Soviet successes in space to promote an image of superiority. This, in turn, was used to put pressure on the West over Berlin.[86]

  THE DIRTY BIRDS

  While the overflights were under way, the Ranch housed the headquarters squadron, called Detachment D, and the training unit for the first group of air force U-2 pilots.[87] The Ranch also served as Lockheed's U-2 flight test center. Starting in late 1956, work was under way on a program that would influence the design of every Dark Eagle to follow and that would see final success two decades later.

  When the U-2 was first developed, it had been hoped that the aircraft would fly so high the Soviets would have only fragmentary tracking data and would not be sure what was going on. During training flights, this theory had been borne out: only one or two radar sites would detect the aircraft. When the overflights started, however, the Soviets were not only able to track the U-2s but vector fighters toward them.[88]

  President Eisenhower was extremely disturbed by the ease with which the Soviets were detecting the U-2 overflights. He directed that work be undertaken to reduce the U-2's "radar cross section." Called Project Rainbow, it had the highest priority and the attention of all the Skunk Works engineers. Eisenhower threatened to end the overflight program should Rainbow fail. Johnson asked advice from two radar experts, Dr. Frank Rogers and Ed Purcell.

  They suggested stringing wires of varying lengths from the nose and tail to the wings. The idea was to scatter the radar signals away from the receiver, which would weaken the radar echo. The modification worked, but with major shortcomings — the U-2's range was cut and its maximum altitude was reduced by seven thousand feet. The wires also whistled and sometimes broke, flapping against the cockpit and fuselage.

  The other attempt was more elaborate. The U-2's underside was covered with a metallic grid, called a Salisbury Screen, and then overlayed with a black foam rubber called Echosorb. The grid would deflect the radar signal into the absorber. The modifications proved to have only limited usefulness.

  At some radar frequencies, they did reduce the U-2's radar cross section. At others, however, the plane's radar echo was made worse. The coating also prevented the engine's heat from dissipating out the skin.

  This latter problem caused the loss of Article 341, the U-2 prototype. On April 4, 1957, Lockheed test pilot Bob Sieker was making a flight at 72,000

  feet. This involved flying the aircraft up and down a radar range for hours on end. The heat buildup caused the plane's engine to flame out. When this happened, cockpit pressurization was lost and Sieker's suit inflated. As it did, the clip holding the bottom of his faceplate failed and it popped open.

  The suit lost pressure, and Sieker passed out within ten seconds. The U-2 went into a flat spin and crashed.

  A search was launched, but the wreckage could not be found. It was Lockheed test pilot Herman "Fish" Salmon who discovered the crash site.

  He rented a twin-engine Cessna from Las Vegas, and three days after the crash, Salmon found the U-2 in a valley near Pioche, Nevada, about ninety miles from the Ranch. The faceplate was still in the cockpit. Sieker's body was fifty feet away. This suggested that he had revived at the last moment and jumped from the plane but was too low for his parachute to open. In the wake of this and other accidents, an ejector seat was added to the U-2. (In June 1957, following the crash, Lockheed moved its test operations from the Ranch to North Base at Edwards Air Force Base.)[89]

  Finally, Johnson decided it was more practical to cover the aircraft with a paint that contained iron ferrite. Later called "Iron Ball" paint, it absorbed some of the radar signals, which reduced the cross section by an order of magnitude.

  The first "Dirty Bird" U-2, as the modified aircraft was called, was sent to Turkey in July 1957. It had wires strung from the nose to poles on the wings, as well as the radar absorbing paint. On July 7, CIA pilot James Cherbonneaux made a Dirty Bird flight along the Black Sea coast to probe Soviet air defenses. Intercepted communications indicated the wires and coatings worked well but that the Soviets were able to pick up radar returns from the cockpit and tailpipe. Two weeks later, he made a Dirty Bird overflight of the central Soviet Union from Pakistan. It covered Omsk and the Tyuratam launch site, before landing back in Pakistan.

  In the end, the loss of altitude caused by the wires was too great and they were removed. The Iron Ball paint continued to be used. At first, it was a light color. This was soon changed to midnight blue, which matched the color of the sky at 70,000 feet. This would make it harder for MiG pilots to […] appearance.

  With the failure of the Dirty Bird U-2, it was now clear to Johnson that a reduced radar cross section would have to designed into a plane from the start, not added on later. Ironically, when final success was achieved, Johnson was one of those who doubted it could work.

  MAY DAY

  U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union remained sporadic throughout 1958 and 1959. Months would pass without one. Eisenhower continued to express fears that the overflights would provoke a Soviet response, even […] a "feeling time was running out. Starting in […] SA-1 SAMs had been fired at the planes. Some had come dangerously close. What overflights were being made could not settle the question of the Soviet ICBM force size.

  Then, in early 1960, information was received that an ICBM site was being built at Plesetsk in the northwest Soviet Union. From this site, SS-6 missiles could reach the northeast United States, including New York, Boston, and Washington, D.C. Although there had been a number of false alarms before, this report seemed solid.

  After some four months without an overflight, Eisenhower approved two in succession for April 1960. One complication was the upcoming Paris Summit Conference set for May 16, 1960, to be followed in June by a visit by Eisenhower to the USSR. Eisenhower observed that the one asset he had at a summit meeting was his reputation for honesty. If a U-2 was lost during the Summit, it could be put on display in Moscow; a disclosure like that would ruin his effectiveness.[90]

  Accordingly, when Eisenhower approved th
e two missions, he added an April 25 cutoff date. Detachment B commander Col. William Shelton selected Bob Ericson and Francis Powers for the overflights. Ericson was a member of the third group who had been originally stationed with Detachment C in Japan. He had later been transferred to Turkey. Powers was the only original member of Detachment B still with the group. He and another pilot had each made at least three overflights.

  Both of the overflights were made from Peshawar, Pakistan. On April 9, Ericson took off. He crossed the Hindu Kush Mountain Range and crossed into Soviet airspace. The primary target was Sary-Shagen, the Soviet's test site for both SAMs and antiballistic missiles, as well as long-range radars.

  This was not the first visit to the site, but earlier photos had been poor. This time the results were good. Ericson headed for the nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk. At this time, both the United States and Soviets were observing a nuclear test moratorium. The U-2 then headed west and photographed Tyuratam before landing at the Zahedan airstrip in Iran.[91]

  The second April overflight would be different. It was to go all the way across the Soviet Union. After takeoff from Peshawar, the route went from Stalinabad, Tyuratam, Chelyabinsk, the Soviet's main nuclear weapons production facility at Sverdlovsk, suspected ICBM sites at Yurya and Plesetsk, then submarine shipyards at Severodvinsk, and naval bases at Murmansk, before landing at Bodo, Norway.[92] The flight demanded the most of both plane and pilot.

  Detachment B was alerted for the overflight, but weather was bad. This mission required the whole of the USSR to be clear. By this time, the April 25 deadline had expired, and Bissell required an extension. Due to lighting conditions caused by its northerly location, Plesetsk could only be covered between April and early September, and during this period, only a few days per month were clear. If not covered now, the Summit and Eisenhower's visit could delay the flight beyond the weather-lighting window. Eisenhower agreed, with May 1, 1960, as the final allowable date.