Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Page 9

  By August 1961, a year after work began, the basic facilities had been completed to support the initial flight tests. Although work would continue for another three years, Groom Lake had been transformed from a ram-shackle collection of hangars and trailers in the desert into a permanent, state-of-the-art flight test center.

  At this same time, the radar test program on the A-ll mock-up had been under way. By the time the work was completed in mid-1961, it was found that most of the radar return came from the vertical stabilizers, the engine inlet, and the forward sides of the nacelles. The edges of the chines and wings, as well as the vertical stabilizers, were made of a radar-absorbing laminated plastic. Of course, this plastic also had to withstand the 500-plus-degree F heat. This was the first time plastic had been used as a structural material. Because of the design changes from the radar tests, the aircraft was renamed the "A-12."[133]

  Groom Lake was also used for low-speed tests of the A-12's ejector seat.

  It would have to work from standing still on the runway up to a speed of over Mach 3 at 100,000 feet. Johnson was never convinced that a capsule ejection system, such as that on the B-58 or XB-70, was needed. The pilot would be wearing a pressure suit, which would provide protection from wind blast and heat. Instead, a modified F-104 seat would be used. The system was tested by towing a fuselage mock-up across the lake bed behind a car.[134] Later, in-flight ejection tests were done using a two-seat F-104.

  Groom Lake had also, by this time, received a new official name. The nuclear test site was divided into several numbered areas. To blend in, Groom Lake became "Area 51." (Its unofficial name remained the Ranch through the 1960s.)

  DELAY

  The first A-12 was originally scheduled to be ready in May 1961. Due to problems with wing assembly and J58 engine development, this date was pushed back to August 30, then December 1. Bissell was very upset by the delays: "I trust this is the last of such disappointments short of a severe earthquake in Burbank," he commented.

  It was not to be — on September 11, 1961, Pratt and Whitney notified Lockheed of continuing problems with the J58's weight, performance, and delivery schedule. The completion date had slipped to December 22, 1961, with the first flight set for February 27, 1962. Because the J58 would not be ready, it was decided to temporarily install J75 engines (used in the F-105, F-106, and U-2C.) This would allow flight tests up to a speed of Mach 1.6 and 50,000 feet. With this, the A-12 program began to pick up momentum.

  But there would be more problems.

  As flight testing neared, activities at Groom Lake also increased. In late 1961, Col. Robert J. Holbury was named Area 51 commander. A CIA officer was his deputy. Support aircraft began arriving in the spring of 1962.

  This consisted of an F-104 chase plane, eight F-100s for training, two T-33s for proficiency flights, a helicopter for search and rescue, a C-130 for cargo, and a Cessna 180 and U-3A for liaison use.

  At Burbank, the first A-12, Article 121, was undergoing final checkout and tests. Once this was finished, the aircraft's wings were removed and the fuselage was loaded into a boxlike trailer, which hid its shape. Article 121

  left Burbank at 3:00 A.M. on February 26, 1962. The route from Burbank to Groom Lake had already been surveyed, and it was found that an object 105

  feet long and 35 feet wide could be moved with only a few road signs having to be removed, trees trimmed, and roadsides leveled to provide clearance. By sunrise, the convoy was out on the desert and away from prying eyes. After arrival, work began on reassembling Article 121 and installing the J75 engines. There was a final delay — the sealing compound had failed to stick to the fuel tank's interior. It was necessary to strip the tanks and reline them.

  THE ARCHANGEL TAKES FLIGHT

  Finally, the A-12 was ready to test its wings. Lockheed test pilot Louis W. Schalk was selected to make the first flight. In preparation, he made several flights in a modified F-100. With the center of gravity aft, it matched the A-12's expected handling characteristics. The first tests in Article 121 were engine runs and low- and medium-speed taxi runs. The prototype A-12 was unpainted and unmarked, with no national insignia, no "U.S. Air Force," no civilian N-number, not even an article number.

  All was ready by April 24, 1962, for a high-speed taxi test. Schalk would momentarily lift the plane off the runway. For this test, the A-12's stability augmentation system (SAS) was left disconnected. Because of its design, the A-12 was inherently unstable under some flight conditions, and the SAS was necessary to keep the plane under control. The SAS was triple redundant in yaw and pitch and double redundant in roll.[135]

  All went well with the taxi test until the A-12 lifted off. As it did, the plane wallowed into the air, the wings rocking from side to side, and the nose high.[136] Schalk recalled later, "I really didn't think I was going to be able to put the aircraft back on the ground safely." Finally, he was able to regain control and cut the throttles. By this point, the A-12 had flown past the end of the runway. As it touched down on the lake bed, the wheels kicked up a huge cloud of dust, hiding the aircraft. The Groom Lake tower asked what was happening. Schalk radioed an answer, but the antenna was on the plane's underside and he could not be heard. Once the A-12 slowed, Schalk turned and the aircraft emerged from the dust cloud. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief. There was no damage from the near mishap. Schalk judged the A-12 was ready for flight, but added that the SAS should be turned on.[137]

  The first A-12 flight was made on April 26. The plane remained aloft for some forty minutes, with the landing gear left down to avoid any retraction problems. Schalk switched off each of the SAS dampers, one by one. The plane remained stable, and he turned them back on and landed.

  The official first flight was made four days later, on April 30. As the plane's landing gear retracted and it accelerated, several fuselage and wing fillet panels began falling off. There were no handling problems, and the plane reached 30,000 feet, a speed of 340 knots, and remained aloft for 59 minutes. The loss of the skin panels was solved by filling the cavities with steel wool. The repairs were completed and, on May 4, the A-12 reached Mach 1.1.[138]

  After nearly a year's delay, the A-12 had embarked on its flight into the unknown. The new CIA director, John McCone, sent a telegram of con-gratulations to Johnson.[139] With the first flights completed, the test program now began expanding. Schalk made the first thirteen flights. In late 1962, three more Lockheed test pilots joined the program — William C. Park, Robert Gilliland, and James D. Eastham. The early flights tested aircraft systems, the inertial navigation system, and midair refueling. This was done using KC-135Q tankers of the 903d Air Refuelling Squadron. A maximum altitude of 60,000 feet was also reached by the end of 1962.

  Because the J58 engines were not yet installed, little could be done in the way of high-speed flight testing. The CIA pressed Lockheed to make a Mach 2 flight, arguing that if the J75-powered F-106 could reach Mach 2, the A-12 should be able to do the same. Finally, Park put an A-12 into a dive and reached Mach 2.16. The flight proved little. Since the inlet-nacelle design was mismatched with the J75 engines, a "duct shutter" resulted— a vibration caused by airflow within the inlet as the plane neared Mach 2.[140]

  As flight testing continued, more A-12s were being delivered to Groom Lake. By August 1962, Article 122 and Article 123 had arrived. Article 124, the A-12T two-seat trainer was moved to Groom Lake in November, and Article 125 arrived on December 17, 1962.

  The Oxcart program received a boost during the summer of 1962 when CIA U-2s discovered the deployment of SA-2 SAMs in Cuba. CIA Director McCone asked if the A-12 could take over the Cuban overflights. The A-12 was still at too early a point in the flight-test program to consider such a mission. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, bringing the A-12 to operational status became one of the highest national priorities.

  Despite the added A-12s now available, the test program was still handi-capped by the delay of the J58 engines. CIA Director McCone decided this was unacce
ptable. He wrote to the president of United Aircraft on December 3, 1962: "I have been advised that J58 engine deliveries have been delayed again due to engine control production problems… By the end of the year it appears we will have barely enough J58 engines to support the flight test program adequately… Furthermore, due to various engine difficulties we have not yet reached design speed and altitude. Engine thrust and fuel consumption deficiencies at present prevent sustained flight at design conditions which is so necessary to complete developments."[141]

  The first J58 finally was delivered to Groom Lake and installed in Article 121. The first problem was getting it started. The small-scale, wind-tunnel model did not adequately predict the internal airflow. As an interim measure, an inlet access panel was removed during ground tests. Holes were later drilled in the nacelles to cure the problem. Article 121 made its initial flights with one J58 and one J75. On January 15, 1963, the first A-12 flight with two J58s was made. By the end of January, ten J58 engines had been delivered and were being installed in the A-12s.

  RECRUITMENT

  Recruitment of the CIA pilots had begun even before the first A-12 flight.

  The Oxcart pilots would need remarkable skill, due both to the performance characteristics of the A-12 and the demands of flying secret intelligence missions. Air Force Brig. Gen. Don Flickinger was picked to establish the requirements. He received advice from both Johnson and CIA Headquarters.

  The initial criteria included experience in high-performance aircraft, emotional stability, and good self-motivation. The pilots also had to be between twenty-five and forty years of age. The small size of the A-12's cockpit meant that the pilots had to be under six feet tall and weigh less than 175 pounds.

  Air force files were screened for possible candidates. The initial list was further reduced by psychological assessments, medical exams, and refine-ment of the criteria. The final evaluation resulted in sixteen potential pilots, who were then subjected to intensive security and medical checks by the CIA. Those still remaining were approached to work "on a highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft."[142] In November 1961, five pilots agreed: William L. Skliar, Kenneth S. Collins, Walter L. Ray, Dennis B. Sullivan, and Alonzo J. Walter. They were a mixed group — Skliar was an Air Force Test Pilot School graduate (Class 56D) and was assigned to the Armament Development Center at Eglin Air Force Base.[143] The others had operational backgrounds. Like the CIA U-2 pilots, they were sheep dipped, leaving the air force to become civilians. Their time with the CIA would be counted toward their rank and retirement. The pay and insurance arrangements were similar to those of CIA U-2 pilots.[144]

  The CIAA-12 pilots arrived at Groom Lake in February 1963. Like their U-2 counterparts in the 1950s, the men found Area 51 "desert, windy and hot, windy and cold, isolated, basic." They made several flights in the A-12T trainer (also called the "Titanium Goose"), then began making training and test flights in the single-seat A-12s. Each pilot had a personal call sign — "Dutch" followed by a two-digit number. The unit was designated the 1129th Special Activities Squadron, nicknamed "the Roadrunners."[145]

  With the deliveries of the J58 engines, and the arrival of the CIA pilots, the program began a three-shift schedule. This required a large number of engineers, who were also recruited in a clandestine manner. One Lockheed engineer was asked if he wanted to work on a "special job." He would be flown to a site, work there all week, then be flown back to Burbank on Friday. In some cases, the engineers were not told what they would be doing until they actually saw the A-12 for the first time.

  SIGHTINGS

  The A-12 was a large, loud, and distinctive-looking aircraft. Keeping it a secret would be a problem. During the early test flights, the CIA tried to limit the number of people who saw the aircraft. All those at Groom Lake not connected with the Oxcart program were herded into the mess hall before the plane took off. This was soon dropped as it disrupted activities and was impractical with the large number of flights.

  As the flights could range across the southwest United States, sightings away from Groom Lake were also a problem. As the A-12 climbed and accelerated, its sonic boom was heard by "the inhabitants of a small village some 30 miles from the test site." A change in the flight path removed this problem.

  Although the airspace above Groom Lake was closed, it was near busy Nellis Air Force Base. So, inevitably, there were sightings. In one case, an air force pilot was flying to a gunnery range in the northwest area of the base. He saw an A-12 climbing through his altitude off in the distance. He could see the shape and realized it was some type of experimental aircraft.

  In another incident, several pilots in a formation saw an A-12. After they landed, a general told all of them that they were to say nothing. Some Nellis pilots saw the A-12 several times. It was common knowledge that something "weird" was going on out in the desert.[146]

  To the southwest of Groom Lake was Edwards Air Force Base. NASA test pilots flew numerous X-15 training and support flights to tracking sites and dry lake beds across California and Nevada. The only areas they avoided were the nuclear test site and the Ranch.[147] At least one NASA test pilot saw an A-12. He radioed the Edwards tower and asked what it was. He was curtly told to halt transmissions. After landing, he was told what he had seen was vital to U.S. security. He also signed a secrecy agreement.[148]

  Sightings were even made from the ground. At 5:30 A.M., an air force captain was checking the main runway at Edwards for any debris before flight operations began for the day. Suddenly, an A-12 made a low pass and then climbed away. Its shape was so unusual that he first thought it was two planes in close formation. The captain called the tower and asked, "What was that airplane?" The tower radioed back, "What airplane?"

  The major source of A-12 sightings was airline pilots. It is believed that twenty to thirty airline sightings were made. One American Airlines pilot saw an A-12 twice. During one sighting, a pilot saw an A-12 and two chase planes; he radioed, "I see a goose and two goslings."[149] Word of these sightings spread among the aerospace community. Aviation Week and Space Technology picked up the rumors. The question became how long the secret could be kept.

  The security problem became greater on May 24, 1963. Kenneth Collins was flying a subsonic training-test flight in Article 123. As he descended into clouds, the pilot-static tube became plugged with ice, which caused the instruments to display an incorrect airspeed. The A-12 stalled and pitched up. Collins was unable to control the plane, and he ejected. He landed safely, while Article 123 crashed fourteen miles south of Wendover, Utah.[150]

  The Nellis Air Force Base base commander was called. "One of your F-105's has just crashed," he was told. He responded, "But that's impossible. They're all here, out on the field." He was curtly told, "Don't argue.

  If anyone asks about a plane crash, you just report that one of your 105's crashed on a routine training flight north of Nellis."[151]

  The F-105 cover story was issued to the press. It took two days to recover the debris. Persons at the scene were requested to sign security agreements. All A-12 aircraft were grounded for a week following the crash. The grounding order was raised once the cause was traced to icing.

  The secrecy held despite the crash. The A-12 was ready to begin its quest for Mach 3.

  TOWARD THE UNKNOWN

  The years 1963 and 1964 were spent bringing the A-12 to Mach 3-plus speeds and operational status. At times, Lockheed and the CIA despaired of ever succeeding. The problem was with the nacelle system and inlet spike.

  As the A-12 flew faster, the spike moved back; this regulated the airflow into the engine.[152] The flight-test program had to develop the "inlet schedule," which would be programmed into the pneumatic system. This controlled the spike's position, according to the plane's speed.[153]

  The A-12's test speed was increased at one-tenth Mach increments. The plane would take off from Groom Lake, then fly north to Wendover, Utah, and onward to the Canadian border. It would then make a 180-deg
ree turn (with a diameter of 128 nautical miles) and head back to Nevada at 65,000 to 72,000 feet. The flight path was called "Copper Bravo." As the A-12 flew back, it would accelerate to the test speed, then decelerate and land. If trouble appeared, at least the plane would be flying toward home at thirty-five miles per minute, rather than away.[154]

  The test flights soon showed that the pneumatic system could not compensate for atmospheric changes. The result was an "unstart." The out-of-position spike disrupted the airflow to the engine, which stopped producing thrust and began overheating. The loss of all thrust on one side caused the A-12 to violently yaw toward the dead engine. This literally bounced the pilot's helmet against the canopy. The pilot had to manually open the bypass doors to break the unstart. As with the U-2's early flameout problems, the unstart would have to be solved before the A-12 could fly in hostile airspace.

  Lockheed engineers tried everything they could think of to cure the problem. The inlet geometry and schedules were changed. The manual trim of the fuel flow, spike position, and bypass door position were speeded up.

  Yet, nothing helped. The two inlets on each A-12 never seemed to match.

  This resulted in multiple unstarts on each flight. Even a special task force could not find a solution.

  Finally, Johnson decided to scrap the existing pneumatic system and replace it with an electronic unit. Even this had problems. During a ground test, the pilot used the radio; this caused a false signal in the electronics and the spike retracted. Once the electronic interference problem was solved, the system proved far more effective, although at the price of much greater maintenance time. The electronic system was retrofitted to the existing aircraft and all new A-12s from Article 129 onward.